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INTRODUCTION
In a realistic and descriptive sense, international law is a complex
and dynamic legal process profoundly interconnected with regional and
domestic legal processes throughout the globe. There are no single
sources or evidences of international law; no single set of participants;
and no single arenas or institutional arrangements for the creation, invo-
cation, application, change or termination of such law. Like all human
law, it is full of human choice and rich in individual and group participa-
tion and interaffectation.
Awareness of this reality can have significant consequences with re-
spect to identification of international legal norms, realistic meaning or
content, remedies, and possible sanction strategies. The reality of inter-
national law might function in ways opposed to certain theoretic
constructs, limiting preferences or biases, and individual psychic needs.
Realism more generally is especially opposed to a rigid state-oriented
positivism and its favored, even dangerous, consequences. Indeed, realist
orientations to international law might be threatening to those with a pre-
tense of power, to those who prefer some unobtainable stability (or
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston.
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perhaps merely their own specially favored value positions), and to do-
mestic governmental elites (and those eager to serve them) who are
anxious to argue that they should control both the content and applica-
tion of law. Awareness of international law as a process involving
numerous participants can also help one to avoid limitations inherent in
simple "horizontal" or "vertical" theoretic models; can enhance recogni-
tion of various overlapping and interstimulating normative and sanction
processes; and can enhance recognition of and actual and potential pat-
terns of participation by international and regional institutional, state,
nation, corporate, private individual, and other actors.
I. CERTAIN FALSE MYTHS CONCERNING ROLES
AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE ACTORS
Adequate attention to prior and potential roles of private actors in the
international legal process and in various domestic legal processes ad-
dressing international law is sometimes inhibited by imagined theoretic
distinctions between public and private competencies and responsibili-
ties. For example, the brochure prepared to advertise this symposium
repeated claims of a few that the "traditional status" of the international
legal "system" had been "the exclusive realm of states" and that "the
traditional view of international law" had considered international law
"as purely interaction of sovereign states." Neither claim is correct. For
at least the last 250 years, such concepts were never traditional and were
always unreal. Moreover, repetition of these and similar false myths can
produce consequences far more serious than inadequate attention and
confusion.
In 1984, a lawsuit alleging state and non-state actor responsibility
for terrorism was dismissed partly because judges had been misled or
were not fully informed about the reach of international law to private
actors.! Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,2 had cor-
rectly noted that "[t]hrough the 18th century and into the 19th, writers
and jurists believed that rules of international law bound individuals as
well as states,"3 but was in serious error when he claimed that by the
1. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
230-31, 235-36, 301-05 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES].
2. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 794(Edwards, J., concurring). Concerning the many early subjects of interna-
tional law and its early reach, including international crimes and human rights, see PAUST,
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES supra note 1, at 7-8, 11-12, 59-61, 193-210, 287-89 n.481,
421-22, 434-35; JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S.
15-17, 23-24, 95, 120-34, 146, 448 (2000) [hereinafter PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
LITIGATION]; infra notes 15, 29-42. The first treaty of major concern to the Founders and
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twentieth century a view shared by a few state-oriented positivists had
"become firmly entrenched" that "states alone were subjects of interna-
tional law, and they alone were able to assert rights and be held to duties
devolved from the law of nations."4 Judge Edwards added, "it follows
logically that the law of nations provides no substantive right to be free
from private acts of individuals, and persons harmed by such acts have
no right, under the law of nations, to assert in federal courts."5 Unfortu-
nately, Judge Bork used a similar erroneous myth in his separate opinion
supporting dismissal.
Some British positivists in the early 1900s had preferred a "states
• 7
alone" view, but such a conception was radically opposed to traditional
eighteenth and nineteenth century Western-and American-views and
was also seriously and widely opposed even at the start of the twentieth
century.8 A study of the rich use of human right precepts from the 1700s
Framers assured protection of rights of British creditors. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 205 (1796) (addressing the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain which, in Article VII,
defined peace "between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other" and revived the
debts owed British creditors).
4. 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing H. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of
the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REv. 438, 439-40 (1947)); Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of
the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 535, 541 (1956)).
5. 726 F2d at 780 n.4.
6. See id. at 805-06, 817(Bork, J., concurring). With respect to the reach of interna-
tional law to private acts of terrorism, see infra notes 49-51, 76. Judge Bork's opinion also
contained several other errors, including: (1) an ahistorical statement that "in 1789 there was
no concept of international human rights," 726 F.2d at 813; (2) a claim that the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA) does not provide a cause of action or right to a remedy, see id. at 798-
801, 820; and (3) an assertion that "international law does not ... recognize the capacity of
private plaintiffs to litigate its rules in municipal courts" or provide a cause of action, see id. at
822. Concerning the first additional error, see, for example, PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 1, at 195-202, 208-09, 236; infra notes 61-62. Concerning the second
additional error, see, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 n.20
(D.N.J. 1999); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter
Forti I]; PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 14-15, 65 n.134, 233-36, 391-
92 n.101 (noting that the ATCA executes and incorporates by reference any partly or fully
non-self-executing treaties); infra notes 13, 15. Concerning the third additional error and hu-
man rights to an effective remedy in domestic courts, see, for example, PAUST, LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 224-29, 235, 314-16, 391-92.
7. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 288-292, 362-69 (2d ed.
1912).
8. See, e.g., PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 227, 235-36, 318-
20 n.603-05. Even Oppenheim knew that his theory was opposed by other Europeans. See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 367 (citing "several writers," including Bonfils, Bluntschli,
Fiore, Martens). Moreover, it was widely known that a "nation" could have treaty relations
and responsibilities even though it was not a "state." See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 4,
32 (1899) (treaty also granting rights to certain lands to Chief Moose Dung and other named
persons); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 724-25, 746, 749, 755 (1835) (Great
Britain-Indian treaty and rights thereunder remained in force when the U.S. acquired the
Floridas); 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249 (1873) (regarding convictions of certain Modoc Indians for
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through the early 1900s and into the 1980s demonstrates that this view
was also unrealistic. 9 More generally, within the United States there had
also been a rich history of claims brought by private individuals or com-
panies against other individuals or companies for several other types of
violations of international law,'0 and civil or criminal sanctions for pri-
vate violations of international law were often interchangeable
depending on who was seeking enforcement: an individual, the govern-
ment, or both."
Some had also assumed that an earlier rarity of direct individual par-
ticipation in sanction institutions at the international level meant that
individuals had no rights or duties under international law.' 2 This form of
error misses the fact that even in the early twentieth century some indi-
viduals and companies had recognizable rights and duties at the
international level and that individual rights were most often imple-
mented, as they are today, in domestic legal processes. The very purpose
of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),' 4 first adopted in 1789, was to as-
sure that aliens had a right of access to federal courts for their claims
concerning violations of customary international law or treaties of the
violations of the laws of war); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 118-19 (5th ed. 1955);
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 7; H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2d ed. 1880). See also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 57 (1999). Similarly, "belligerents" in a civil war were not the equivalent of "states";
and Great Britain, other European states, and the United States had recognized the Confeder-
ate States of America, not as a state, but as a "belligerent" for purposes of trade, laws of
neutrality, or the laws of war. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666, 669
(1862).
9. See, e.g., PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 195-224.
10. See, e.g., id. at 227, 292-96 nn.502-03; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsi-
bilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 801, 803-08 (2002) [hereinafter Paust,
Private Corporations].
11. See, e.g., PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 227, 298 n.505.
12. See, e.g., id. at 231, 236, 303 n.541.
13. See, e.g., id. at 319-20 n.604 (citing varied references including statements of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927 and 1928). In 1907, an Opinion of the U.S.
Attorney General recognizing that a private U.S. dredging company violated a treaty by dredg-
ing activities diverting the Rio Grande, noted that an International Water Boundary
Commission "found... that the... Company ... violated the stipulations of that treaty," and
recognized that injuries included "damage to property," including injury to "riparian rights,"
and "[a]s to indemnity for injuries which may have been caused to citizens of Mexico, I am of
the opinion that existing statutes provide a right of action and a forum .... [T]he statutes
[including the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)] provide a forum and a right of action." 26 Op.
Att'y Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907). In this general period, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that even though claims before a U.S.-Mexican Commission were those of governments, a
private company had a claim of right under a "treaty and the award of the Commission" and
such right is undoubtedly "susceptible of judicial determination" in domestic courts. La Abra
Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 458, 461 (1899).
14. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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United States. 5 Further, it was widely known that "nations" and "bellig-
erents" are different actors than states and that nations were also capable
of creating treaty-based international law.' 6 "Self-determination" is also a
right of participation of "peoples,"' 7 not states, thereby demonstrating the
existence of additional non-state actors.
The false myth that international legal "norms bind only states and
persons acting under color of a state's law, not private individuals,' ' " was
reiterated a decade after Tel-Oren by Radovan Karadzic in a civil pro-
ceeding addressing his involvement in war crimes, genocide, other
crimes against humanity, torture, and other human rights violations. In
contrast to errors in Tel-Oren, Judge Newman rightly rejected the claim
"that the law of nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its
reach to state action" and recognized that "certain forms of conduct vio-
late the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals."' 9 However, even Judge
Newman's more thorough inquiry into evidence of the existence of pri-
vate rights and duties under international law proved to be insufficient
when he was faced with the question whether private individuals can
commit impermissible acts of torture under human rights law. With re-
spect to torture, he did not consider express and implied private duties
identifiable in various general human rights instruments, 20 but focused on
a limiting definition contained in two instruments addressing torture."
15. Concerning early use of the ATCA, see, for example, PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note I, at 14, 63 n.127, 233-34, 286-88, 312, 314, 391-92; Jordan J. Paust, The
History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249 (2004) [here-
inafter Paust, Alien Tort Claims Act]. The ATCA requires that a plaintiff be an alien, but cases
and opinions of the Attorneys General demonstrate that a defendant can be a U.S. or foreign
perpetrator of a private (individual, group, or corporate) or public character. See PAUST, LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 14, 63-64 nn.128-131; Paust, Private Corporations,
supra note 10, at 820-22. Moreover, by enacting the ATCA as a means of determining what
claims are cognizable before the courts, Congress chose to exercise its constitutional power to
incorporate international law by reference, which Supreme Court cases have recognized is a
congressional prerogative not to be second-guessed by the judiciary. See, e.g., PAUST, LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 13-14, 64-65 n.133, 391 n.101. Concerning Supreme
Court recognition of congressional choice to incorporate by reference, see, for example, In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 27-30 (1942); United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820). Furthermore, when incorporated by reference
or otherwise utilized by federal courts, customary international legal norms need only be "suf-
ficiently determinable." See, e.g., Paust, Alien Tort Claims Act, supra, at 258-59 n.25.
16. See supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1 , 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR].
18. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239.
19. Id.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243-44. Judge Newman cited the definition of torture
in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Michigan Journal of International Law
This focus led to an erroneous conclusion that torture, outside "the
course of genocide or war crimes," is proscribed "only when commit-
ted by state officials or under color of law.' 22 The phrase "color of law"
is not a phrase that is found in international law. It is a construct that
was seemingly borrowed from U.S. domestic limitations of responsibil-
ity and used to argue improperly that similar limitations exist on
individual duties with respect to the proscription of torture under inter-
national law.
The error and unreality of myths that international law had been or
is merely state-to-state and that there had been or are no private duties
can also be demonstrated by more detailed attention to the reach of
international criminal law and human rights law to private actors, the
focus of the next two Parts. These two Parts additionally demonstrate
that duties and rights under international law are often addressed do-
mestically as well as at the international level and provide a glimpse at
complex interconnections among norms, arenas, and sanctions.
II. THE REACH OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The reality of the reach of international law to individual actors
was stressed by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in
opposition to defense claims "that international law is concerned
[merely] with the actions of sovereign States, and provides no punish-
ment for individuals; and further, that where the act in question is an
act of State, those who carry it out are not personally responsible....
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals
as well as States," the Tribunal affirmed, "has long been recognized. 23
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 55-56, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14, which states, "[f]or the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture'
means, [inter alia] any act ... inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." However, even
with such a limited definition it is not clear that a private perpetrator of torture is acting under
"color of law" in every case in which a public actor merely acquiesces. The tests for "color of
law" adopted in Kadic were broad enough to find responsibility when a private actor acts
"together with" or "in concert with" a state or "with significant state aid' 70 F.3d at 245, but
mere "acquiescence" can be broader. A similar test for "color" in Iwanowa included the
phrases "in close cooperation with" and "worked closely with." Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F Supp. 2d. at 445, 446 n.27. Further, general human rights instruments contain no such
limiting phrases with respect to the prohibition of torture. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 17, art.
7, at 175.
22. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243.
23. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg): Judgment and Sentences, reprinted in
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220 (1947). This rationale can be used by analogy to recognize that
states carrying out the plan or actions of an international organization (e.g., the United Nations
or NATO) are still responsible even if the organization also has responsibility.
1234 [Vol. 25:1229
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Rejecting the false myth that international law is simply state-to-state,
the Tribunal also recognized: "Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities .... [and] individuals have
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedi-
ence imposed by the individual state. ,24 The same can be said of
violations of human rights law, although certainly many violators are
official elites who also claim to represent states or other abstract enti-
ties. Furthermore, like international crimes, most human rights
violations occur in the territory of a single state, although such actions
are essentially of international concern. Clearly also, most of the vic-
tims are private individuals. It is not difficult to understand, then, that
patterns of practice involving violations of international criminal law
and human rights more generally are not merely patterns involving in-
teractions among states or state actors.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg offered another
important recognition relevant to individual responsibility under cus-
tomary international law and notions of state authority or
"sovereignty." When faced with a claim that those acting on behalf of
or with the approval of the state are immune from the reach of interna-
tional law, the Tribunal rightly declared:
The principle of international law, which under certain circum-
stances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot be
applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by interna-
tional law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves
behind their official position .... He who violates the laws of
war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law.
25
As the Tribunal affirmed, acts taken in violation of international
law are beyond the lawful authority of any state, are ultra vires, and
cannot be covered by immunity. 6 Indeed, "sovereignty" is conditioned
24. Id. at 221.
25. Id.
26. See also Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions,
In 27-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/milutinovic/tralc/decision-e/ 110873516829.htm (ruling that President Milosevic of Yugoslavia
had no immunity from alleged international crimes as a head of state and that Article 7 of the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, rejecting head of state immunity,
"reflects a rule of customary international law"); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, Order,
140, at 54 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://www.un.orglicty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/fur-
tj981210e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 4, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Kambanda/
judgenentkambanda.html (ex-Prime Minister); Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, Decision on the
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo Aug. 10, 1995),
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on obedience to international law, the law upon which sovereignty
rests. Many U.S. courts have applied the ultra vires rationale with re-
spect to violations of international law as well as violations of foreign
domestic law to find acts by heads of state and other officials to be not
lawful "public" or "sovereign" acts, therefore not protected by sover-
eign immunity."
available at, http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (regarding "crimes which
are universal in nature, ... the sovereign tights of States cannot and should not take precedence");
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, [ 52-
59, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993); Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, Principles I & III, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A11316 (1950) ("I. Any person who commits and act which
constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore.... Im. The fact that a person
who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or
responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.");
JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (1948); United States
v. von Leeb (The High Command Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 462,489 (1950) ("International law
operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty of nations.") [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS]; United States v. von Weizsaeker, (The Ministries Case), 12, 13 & 14 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS (1950-51) (diplomatic immunity applies only to legitimate acts of state and not to
violations of international law); Bernard Oxman, International Decisions: Prefecture of Voiotia v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 765, 766 (1998); PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 1, at 236, 422, 435-39; JORDAN J. PAUST, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 27-34, 38, 42, 45-53, 55-70, 73-74, 88-99, 132, 132, 136, 171-73
(2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights:
Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9,
17 (1996); Andrea Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to Violations of Human Rights, 46 AUSTRIAN J.
PUB. & INT'L L. 195 (1994); Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 5 ISR. YRaK. HUM. RTS.
55, 82-83, 85-86 (1975); Leslie Green, International Crimes and the Legal Process, 29 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 567,570 (1980).
Nonimmunity for human rights violations has also been mandated in treaties. See, e.g.,
ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2, (3)(a), at 174 (duty of states "[t]o ensure that any person whose
rights ... are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity"); American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, art. 25(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 151; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 21, arts. 1(1), 14(1) (duty to ensure
redress and fair and adequate compensation); General Comment 20, art. 7, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., 44th Sess., at 29, 2, U.N. Doc HRJIGEN/1 (1992) available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/gencomm/hrcomms.htm ("whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity,
outside their capacity or..."); Id. at 32, 13 ("whether committed by public officials or other per-
sons acting on behalf of the State ... those who violate ... must be held responsible"). Moreover,
every modem international criminal law instrument applies to any person or everyone who commits
a relevant crime, thus reaching any official as well as any private perpetrator. See also Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 27(1), adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Con-
ference, July 17, 1998, reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 206, 219 (2000) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT].
27. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F3d 1467,
1470-71 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp.
880, 892-95, 898-99 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F Supp. 162, 175-76 (D. Mass.
1995); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) ("[T]here is no discretion
to commit, or to have one's officers or agents commit, an illegal act .... no 'discretion' to perpetu-
ate conduct designed to result in ... assassination .. ., action that is clearly contrary to the precepts
of humanity, as recognized in both national and international law."); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1236 [Vol. 25:1229
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In the United States, there had been early attention
to a significant number of international crimes that can
be committed by private perpetrators and provide universal jurisdiction
for criminal or civil sanctions, including piracy; 21 war
AND LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 25, 303-04, 313-14, 323-25, 592-93, 651-53, 676-77, 709-11;
PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 306-07, 312-14, 421-22, 438-39 n.72. See
also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765, 789 (1950) (discussing that no public official im-
munity exists for war crimes); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 252-53 (1822) (If a
sovereign "comes personally within our limits, although he generally enjoy a personal immunity, he
may become liable to judicial process in the same way, and under the same circumstances, as the
public ships of the nations' which were subject to jurisdiction in our courts with respect to viola-
tions of the law of nations (the law of neutrality)); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294
(1808) (foreign public acts violative of the law of nations are beyond foreign 'jurisdiction" and are
not entitled to recognition as lawful public acts); In re Doe v. United States, 860 F2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.
1988) ("there is respectable authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-of-state
for private or criminal acts in violation of American law," (citing The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135, 144 (1812))); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987) ("sovereigns are not immune from suit for their viola-
tions of international law"), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); West v. Multibanco
Comermex, S.A., 807 F2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) ("violations of international law are not 'sover-
eign' acts"), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F Cas. 832,
847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551) ("no nation can rightfully permit its subjects to carry ... on
[a violation of international law, "an offence against the universal law of society"], or exempt them
... [and] no nation can privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of nations"); Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38, 52-54 (D.D.C. 2000) ("nations that operate in a manner incon-
sistent with international norms should not expect to be granted the privilege of immunity from
suit"); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F Supp. 1189, 1197-98 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (acts of torture are
"acts which exceed the lawful boundaries of a defendant's authority" and are therefore nonim-
mune); Paul v. Avril, 812 E Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (acts alleged in violation of
international law "hardly qualify as official public acts"); Kalmich v. Bruno, 450 E Supp. 227, 229
n.2 (N.D. 111. 1978) (act of state doctrine does not apply to acts in violation of international law); 9
Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859) ("A sovereign who tramples upon the public law of the world
cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision of his own municipal code"). For cases recogniz-
ing nonimmunity for violations of international law despite commissions from any foreign prince or
state, see, for example, United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 201-02 (1820); The
Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298, 299-301, 304, 307-09 (1819); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
238, 257-58 (1816). But see Plaintiffs A. v. Zemin, 282 F Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Abiola v.
Abubakar, 267 E Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Il. 2003); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 E Supp. 2d 259
(S.D.N.Y 2001); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 E Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994) (addressing so-called
common law head of state immunity, apparently unaware of international laws and other cases
addressed herein).
28. See, e.g., United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210,
232, 235 (1844); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 197 (stating that piracy "is against
all, and punished by all .... within this universal jurisdiction"); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 161, 163 (1820); United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 147-48, 152
(1820) (explaining that piracy "is punishable in the Courts of all ... [and] Courts of this country are
authorized and bound to punish"); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159 (1795) (Iredell, J.,
concurring) ("[A]I1 piracies and trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are inquir-
able, and may be proceeded against, in any nation... "); Davison v. Seal Skins, 7 E Cas. 192, 194
(C.C.D. Conn. 1835) (No. 3,661) (private recovery of property taken by non-state actor pirates); 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1765). Concerning addi-
tional early and continued recognition of universal jurisdiction over violations of customary
international law, see, for example, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 26, at 71 ("[A]l1 States
have the right to punish ... violators" of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions); I Op. Att'y
Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("[as] an offence against the law of nations .... it is the interest as well as the
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crimes;' 9 breaches of neutrality, territorial infractions, "aggression,"
and other crimes against peace;3 ° unlawful capture of vessels;3' the
slave trade;32 violence against foreign ministers and other officials;33
poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries;34  counterfeiters of foreign
currency; banditti and brigands; 3 6 terroristic publications; 3 1 violation
of passports;38 violation of safe-conducts;3 9 and more generally "all...
duty of every government to punish ... all the individuals" who commit violations of teritorial
fights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987); PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 420-23,432-41.
29. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 39 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.); Jordan J.
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REv. 99, 112-15,
129-30 (1972) [hereinafter Paust, Viemam]. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942)
("From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as
including that part of the law of nations which prescribes ... the status, rights and duties of enemy
nations as well as enemy individuals.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y 1806) (No. 16,342) (Pater-
son, J., on circuit) (private war, breach of neutrality); Henfield's Case, It F Cas. 1099, 1107-15
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (breach of neutrality in violation of customary international law and
treaties; and acts of aggression); I Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) (violation of territorial rights and
"the peace of mankind"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796) (breach of neutrality); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58 (1795) ("acts of hostility"; breach of neutrality; and offense "against the public peace"); Res. of
1781, 21 J. CONT. CONG. 1136-37 (1781) (also addressing more generally "infractions of the laws
of nations," "offences against the law of nations:' and the need for compensation as well as criminal
prosecution), reprinted in PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 26, at 174-75.
31. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F
Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464 (1840); United States v. The Ship
Garonne, 36 U.S. ( 1I Pet.) 73 (1837); The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824); Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 F Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a); United States v. Haun, 26 F Cas. 227
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329); United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F Cas. 832, 845-48
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); The Tryphenia v. Harrison, 24 F Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806)
(No. 14,209). See also I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 181 (1826).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826) (violence against
charge d' affaires); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 111, 116-17 (1784) (assault on
foreign consul); United States v. Liddle, 26 F Cas. 936 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598) (assault on a
foreign minister); United States v. Hand, 26 F Cas. 103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297) (assault on
charge d' affaires); Res of 1781, supra note 30, at 1136-37. See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28,
at 70-71; 1 KENT, supra note 32, at 44.
34. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 514-15 (1821). Concerning civil remedies for assassination, see,
for example, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F3d at 243-44 (suggesting that summary execution is a violation of international law
when committed in the course of genocide and war crimes, or when committed by a state actor);
Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 E Supp. 2d 1250, 1261-62 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (holding
that extrajudicial killing is an actionable tort under the Alien Tort Claims Act); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002);
Estate of Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 157 F Supp. 2d 1345, 1358-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F Supp. at 184-85.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
36. See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 305-07 (1865); Paust, Vietnam, supra note 29, at 129
(citing Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 188-
90(1945)).
37. See, e.g., 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 52, 52-53 (1794).
38. See, e.g., Res. of 1781, supra note 30; 1 KENT, supra note 32, at 171.
39. See, e.g., Res. of 1781, supra note 30; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 68.
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trespasses committed against the general law of nations"40 and the
treaties of the United States.'
Today, the number of specific international crimes that can
be committed by private individuals has increased from earlier
categories to include, among others, the following: genocide;
4 2
other crimes against humanity;
43 apartheid;" race discrimination;
4 5
hostage-taking; 6  torture;47  forced disappearance of persons;
40. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 159-61. See also Res. of 1781, supra note 30 (con-
cluding that "[t]The preceding being only those offences against the law of nations which are most
obvious... ).
41. See, e.g., Res. of 1781, supra note 30 ("infractions of treaties and conventions to which
the United States are a party").
42. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRMINAL LAW, supra note 26, at 917-34. With
respect to civil sanctions, see, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d at 241-42; Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 E Supp. 2d 289, 305-06, 327 (S.D.N.Y 2003);
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F Supp. 2d 1322, 1328-29, 1354-55 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Mushikiwabo v.
Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3637 (JSM), 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4409 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 8, 1996).
43. See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 26, at 855-916. Concern-
ing civil sanctions, see, for example, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F3d at 236; Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198
F. Supp. 2d at 1322, 1328-29, 1344, 1352-56; Estate of Cabello v. Femando-Larios, 157 F. Supp.
2d at 1350-51, 1360-61, 1366.
44. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
"Apartheid" G.A. Res 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974).
45. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrmina-
tion, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
46. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205; United States v. Yunis, 681 F Supp. 896, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
47. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Crel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, supra note 21; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9,
1985, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, 25 I.L.M. 519. Concerning civil sanctions, see, for example, Wiwa, 2002
U.S. Dist. Lexis 3293 passim; Presbyterian Church of the Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F
Supp.2d 289 passim; Doe v. Unocal, 963 F Supp. 880 passim.
48. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 529; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., 92d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133
(1992). See also PAusT, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 278 n.421, 281-82 n.450,
371, 421, 433, 438-39; Jordan J. Paust, After 9/11, "No Neutral Ground" With Respect to Human
Rights: Executive Claims and Actions of Special Concern and International Law Regarding the
Disappearance of Detainees, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Paust, 9/11]. The definition of
forced disappearance in Article II of the Inter-American Convention contains a limiting phrase "per-
petrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of the state." Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons, supra, art. 2. Thus, it will reach some, but not all, private actors. The Convention also rec-
ognizes that forced disappearance is a crime against humanity. Id. pmbl. Forced disappearance is
also among customary prohibitions jus cogens. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987). Concerning civil sanctions, see, for exam-
ple, Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Tachiona v. Mugabe,
234 E Supp. 2d 401, 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F Supp. 3, 10
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terrorism;4 9 terrorist bombings;" financing of terrorism;5 aircraft hi-
jacking;52 aircraft sabotage and certain other acts against civil
aviation; 3 certain acts against the safety of maritime navigation, in-
cluding boatjacking;5 4 murder, kidnapping, or other attacks on the
person or liberty of internationally protected persons; 51 trafficking in
certain drugs;56 slavery ;57 and mercenarism.
5 8
(D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F Supp. at 184-85; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp.
707, 710-12 (N.D. Cal. 1988) [hereinafter Forti II].
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2333 (2000); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res.
56/160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc A/56/56/160 (2001) ; Measures to Eliminate Interna-
tional Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/60 (1994);
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 67th
plen. mtg., 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/51 (1991); United States v. bin Laden, 92 E Supp. 2d 189, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CaMINAL LAW, supra note 26, at 995-1007. Concerning
civil sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, see, for example, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 E3d
1000 (7th Cir. 2002); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille auro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) ("suing
terrorist organizations").
50. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A.
Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 (1998).
51. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/54/109 (2000).
52. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; United States v.
Rezaq, 134 F3d 1121, 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998); United
States v. Yousef, 927 E Supp. 673, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Yunis, 681 E
Supp. at 900-01.
53. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000); Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
54. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, Int'l Maritime Org. Doc. SUA/CON/15/Rev.1.
55. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,
1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; United States v. Kim, No. 03 Cr. 413, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18637
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2003); United States v. bin Laden, 92 E Supp. 2d at 198-99, 202, 215,
217-18.
56. See, e.g., Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30,
1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151; Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous
Drugs, June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299, amended by 12 U.N.T.S. 179 (Dec. 11, 1946); PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 26, at 1051-61, 1063-67 (citing cases).
57. See, e.g., Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol
Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 182 U.N.T.S. 51. Concerning civil sanctions,
see, for example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 E Supp. 2d at 296,
298, 303, 305-06, 326; Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. at 10 ("sexual slavery");
Paust, Private Corporations, supra note 10, at 805-08 (collecting cases).
58. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/44/34
(1989).
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From the above, it is evident that it cannot be realistic to claim that
tradition during the last 250 years had been that international law was
merely state-to-state or that individuals did not have duties. Such unreality
is also evident in the next Part with respect to the reach of human rights
law. It is also useful to note that the primary arena for enforcement of in-
ternational criminal law had been and still is within the state, despite the
growing number of international fora for prosecution.9 With respect to
"fragmentation" of an international legal "system," it is interesting that the
new International Criminal Court, despite its limited jurisdiction, is a
modern advance toward defragmentation of what has always been a rela-
tively "fragmented" but complex international legal sanctions process.
Therefore, opposition to jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
tends to support fragmentation.
III. THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Early and Continuing Attention to Human Rights
As documented in a detailed study of the recognition and use of
human rights and related precepts prior to and throughout the history of
the United States, there had been an early and rich interrelationship
between human rights and individual rights and duties prior to the
creation of the post-World War II international human rights
instruments. 60 Further study would be useful, but there had also been an
early use of human rights precepts and claims in Europe, Latin America,
and other areas outside the United States.6' Moreover, what has been
59. For identification of prior and current international criminal tribunals, their limited
jurisdiction and certain primacies over domestic jurisdiction, including the International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and International Criminal Court (ICC), see, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 26, at 621-716.
60. See United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860); PAUST, LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 195-224; . In Haun, Justice Campbell emphasized
President Jefferson's far earlier recognition of "violations of human rights" by private "citi-
zens of the United States" in other countries. Haun, 26 F. Cas. at 231. President Jefferson had
made such remarks in his Sixth Annual Message to Congress in 1806 concerning private hu-
man rights duties to not engage in the slave trade. See PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 202.
61. PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 195-96, 199-200, 200 n.l 11,
205-07, 236 nn. 603-04; Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
reprinted in ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 21-24 (1994); MYRES
S. McDOUGAL, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3-6, passim (1980) [here-
inafter McDOUGAL, HUMAN RIGHTS]. For a few more recent foreign decisions recognizing
private duties, see, for example, Paust, Private Corporations, supra note 10, at 809-10 (Can-
ada, Germany, Israel, Japan, United Kingdom). For recognition by European international
institutions of private duties under human rights law, see, for example, Case 43/75, Defrenne
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documented is sufficient to demonstrate that the traditional reach of
human rights involved private rights and duties long before the
misrepresentations of a few British theorists in the early twentieth
century and the current adherents of a "states alone" viewpoint. This
study also provides evidence of early and continued refutation of a
theory of absolute "state" sovereignty offered by some "states alone" and
refutation of the association of raw power, even state power, adherents
with authority,6' a theoretic association convenient for those alleging the
permissibility of early British oppression of other peoples, or
communist63 and other forms64 of internal and external oppression.
B. Human Rights Instruments Often Reach
Private Perpetrators
As documented in a study of human rights duties of private corpora-
tions, most modem human rights instruments create private duties
v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Saben, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 457-63 (E.C.J.
recognition that corporations may be liable for discrimination in violation of human rights);
Case 36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste International, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 1419
(same).
62. See PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 546-60, 562-66, 568-69,
600-02, 634 n.545. Concerning authority, see also, id. at 326, 328-31, 333-35, 340, 342, 347-
48, 351-53, 356-57; supra notes 26-27; infra note 64; section VII, infra.
63. See generally HERBERT MARCUSE, SOVIET MARXISM-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 188-
93, 198-99, 225-26, 245 (1961); GRIGORII I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-
83, 137, 431, 435-36, 438 (William E. Butler trans., 1974). C.f id. at 382 ("The subjects of
international legal responsibility are the subjects of international law; consequently, they are
above all, and primarily, states.... In isolated instances there occurs responsibility of physical
persons."); A. P. Movchan, The Human Rights Problem in Present-Day International Law, in
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 239 (Grigory Tunkin ed. 1969) ("Oppenheim
wrote that 'although such treaties generally speak of rights which individuals shall have ... ,
this is, as a rule, nothing more than an inaccuracy of language.... .' The Soviet science of in-
ternational law is unequivocal in its claim that the 'legal position of individuals is determined
by national and not international law.' "); G.I. Tunkin, Peaceful Coexistence and International
Law, in id. 5, 32 ("international law as an expression of state will"); N.A. Ushakov, Interna-
tional Law and Sovereignty, in id. 97, 99-102 ("The supremacy of the state means
subordination to it of all persons and organisations within the bounds of state territory. The
state has supreme power.... All these organisations and persons are bound to submit to it....
Only the will of the sovereign state, expressed in state power, becomes a law... The very
concept of state supremacy negates the possibility of formally restricting state power. State
power operates on the basis of the law and order it itself creates.") (emphasis in original).
64. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 658-59 (1958) (stating that positivist-trained German lawyers in the 1930s
were so "prepared to accept as 'law' anything that called itself by that name, was printed at
government expense and seemed to come 'von oben herab"' that they were the first to fall in
line and to support the evil Hitlerian regime); Jordan J. Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a
Better Understanding of Content, Authority, and Choice, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 226, 268, 270-72,
274-77 (1980) [hereinafter Paust, Norms].
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expressly or by implication.65 Several instruments recognize or create
private duties in preambular provisions and in particular articles, and in
many articles duties and prohibitions are not limited to particular types
of actors.6 Many human rights instruments expressly deny the right of
any group or person to engage in conduct aimed at the destruction of
rights of others or at their limitation, thereby necessarily recognizing
duties of all groups or persons.67
C. Multiple Instruments and Institutions
Given the multiplicity of human rights instruments and institutions
some might wonder whether the existence of the United Nations and
other international and regional human rights bodies, each with their
own jurisdictional competence over certain violations of human rights
law, poses serious problems of "fragmentation" among international in-
stitutions or for the global community. In general, institutional
fragmentation among human rights bodies is not a serious problem68 and
the major problem for humankind is not that various international insti-
tutions can address a particular human rights violation, but that many do
so indirectly or relatively ineffectively.69 More generally, justice abhors a
vacuum and tolerates varied attempts toward realization of its achieve-
ment.
With respect to hierarchic norms and concurrent enforcement com-
petencies, the U.N. Charter will generally prevail in case of an
unavoidable clash with another international agreement. 0 One might also
assume that its human rights bodies would have primacy, but the Charter
invites concurrent human rights enforcement effort by expressing a duty
of states to take "joint and separate action"7' to achieve "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights. 72 Regional human rights
bodies also consider decisions of other human rights bodies, which leads
65. For a detailed discussion the reach of Human Rights Instruments, see Paust, Private
Corporations, supra note 10, at 810-15.
66. See id. at 811-15.
67. See id. at 812-15.
68. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 785 (2d ed. 2000).
69. See Bums H. Weston, et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 585, 588-92 (1987) (addressing various benefits de-
rived from the existence of a greater number of human rights initiatives), reprinted in
RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 640-42 (2d ed. 1991).
70. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103. However, jus cogens norms prevail over treaties. See,
e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 49-51.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 56; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL Hu-
MAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 783 (2d ed. 2000) (Inis Claude claiming that an original purpose
might have been to have regional bodies subject to U.N. control).
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
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to normative integration or interstimulation with respect to normative
content. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights contemplate such a process as
well as consideration of the effects of other human rights treaties,73 and
no significant problems are evident. Cross-identification of rights is also
contemplated, for example, in the European Convention 4 and the
ICCPR,75 both of which declare a primacy for certain human rights con-
tained in other international agreements and assure their consideration in
connection with interpretive tasks. 6 Some human rights treaties require a
primacy for provisions in other treaties or customary international law
only if they are "more conducive" to effectuation of specific rights at
73. See, e.g., "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Ser. A., No. 1, at 25, 42 (1982)
(Article 64 covers "any provision dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any
international treaty applicable in the American States, regardless of whether it be bilateral or
multilateral, whatever be the principal purpose of such a treaty .. "); African Charter on Hu-
man and People's Rights, June 21, 1981, pmbl., arts. 60-61, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (the African "Commission
shall draw inspiration from" and the African "Commission shall also take into consideration")
[hereinafter African Charter]; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 26, pmbl.
("Considering ... principles ... set forth [inter alia] ... in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, and that they have been reaffirmed and refined in other international instruments,
worldwide as well as regional in scope"), arts. 29 ("No provision of this Convention shall be
interpreted as ... (d) [e]xcluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have"), 64 (the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights can entertain questions raised by member states "re-
garding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states... '). See also Gabriel M. Wilner, Reflections on Re-
gional Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 407, 408-09, 411-12 (1995-96).
74. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, pmbl. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 ("for the collective enforcement of certain of the
Rights stated in the Universal Declaration") [hereinafter European Convention]. See also
Wilner, supra note 73, at 408, 410-11. Professor Wilner also notes that expectations exist that
the Universal Declaration is meant to provide a set of minimum or core-value guarantees. See
id. at 409, 420-26. See also McDoUGAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 90, 274, 302,
321-22, 325-27 (the Universal Declaration clarifies basic human rights guaranteed in the
U.N. Charter and is a primary part of the International Bill of Human Rights, which includes
further clarification of primary rights in the International Covenants).
75. ICCPR, supra note 17, pmbl., at 173 (addressing the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and the United Nations Charter).
76. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 5(2), at 174 ("There shall be no restriction upon or
derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party
to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations custom on the pretext that
the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them at a lesser ex-
tent."); European Convention, supra note 74, art. 60, at 250 ("Nothing in this Convention shall
be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental free-
doms which may be ensured.., under any other agreement" of a signatory).
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stake," which seems to assure that the rights contained in the specific
instrument provide a minimum set of guarantees that can be supple-
mented. This last approach seems preferable to one declaring a primacy
for any human rights contained in other instruments, as in the case of the
European Convention, or any "fundamental" human rights, as in the case
of the ICCPR, since in a given case the full effectuation of a right con-
tained in another instrument might lessen the full effectuation of rights
contained in the European Convention or the ICCPR. This is particularly
strange with respect to the ICCPR, since it is a major human rights treaty
that is meant to provide universal minimum standards in supplementa-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights within a process that
tolerates regional expansion, particulars, or experimentation as long as
regional relativism or the regional practices do not result in violations of
the core of minimum human rights guarantees 8 In any event, as noted,
the U.N. Charter has primacy over other treaties and jus cogens norms
will prevail over contrary norms contained in any treaty.79
IV. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS IN NORMATIVE FORMATION,
MODIFICATION, AND SANCTIONS
In another study, the author has identified the realistic role and forms
of participation of individuals in the formation and modification of cus-
tomary international law.8° Such forms of participation are no less real
with respect to international agreements. 8' Knowledge of the reality of
77. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 41(b), 1577
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, art. 23(b), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13;.
78. See also Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, G.A. Res.
107, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 5, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107 (2000) ("stresses that all
human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and that the intema-
tional community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same
global footing and with the same emphasis, and reaffirms that, while the significance of na-
tional and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cul-
tural systems, to promote and protect all human rights").
79. See supra note 70. For lists of customary norms jus cogens, see, for example, Gen-
eral Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR H.R. Comm., 52d Sess., 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 839; PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 376-77; and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987).
80. See Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary
Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 155-58, 162 (1995-96) [hereinafter Paust,
Evidences of Customary Human Rights]. See also LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 76-81 (2d ed. 2002).
81. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340. (the "ordinary meaning" is utilized and, thus necessarily, a meaning
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individual participation in normative formation and modification allows
one to avoid myths that individuals are mere objects of international law
or that international law is made merely by state elite practice and expec-
tations.82 In contrast, a tunnel-vision focus on merely formalistic
international law-making and law-applying institutions and certain for-
mally recognized roles of groups and individuals will inhibit more
comprehensive awareness of the varied roles and actual patterns of non-
state actor participation in normative formation and sanction processes.
Moreover, state elite and state and international institutional decisions
are subject to a "process of review" that allows participation of individu-
als and groups in a dynamic review of decisions and acceptance,
modification, or termination of the efficacy of decisions and underlying
norms." Awareness of actual patterns of participation also allows recog-
nition of the fact that the international legal process is not purely vertical
or horizontal and that it is not significantly fragmented."
Individuals can also play effective roles in various political, diplo-
matic, economic, juridic, and power-coercive sanction processes.
Comprehensive awareness of individual participation in various sanction
processes allows one to recognize not merely past forms of participation,
but also potential future roles and varied types of strategies that might be
usefully employed.85
More generally, the efficacy, predictability and stability of interna-
tional law ultimately rest upon real processes of power and authority in
which all participate, however indirectly. When all the various voices are
heard or represented, it is more likely that law will be effective, predict-
able and more stable.
V. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS IN SANCTION PROCESSES
Attempts to restrict every form of participation by non-state actors
would be futile, perhaps like attempts to command every molecule in an
ocean's waves to refrain from trespassing on some king's supposed
beachhead. Since broad participation is also democratizing with respect
reflecting the generally shared meaning of a treaty's term or phrase extant in the human
community and a meaning conditioned by patterns of expectation); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 3, at 57-69.
82. See Paust, Evidences of Customary Human Rights, supra note 80, at 156-58.
83. See, e.g., id. at 157.
84. See id. at 158.
85. See id. at 160-61.
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to both the evolving content 6 and continued application of international
law, attempts at control also seem less than preferable.
VI. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS OF AUTHORITY
AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The role of individuals in association with others is also central to
international legal standards of authority and self-determination. Human
rights relevant to individual dignity, the process of authoritative govern-
ment, and the related precept of self-determination of peoples (not
states) are enshrined in the U.N. Charter.87 Additionally, the ICCPR lists
political self-determination as a human right and recognizes that "[b]y
virtue of that right" all peoples have the right to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural de-
velopment."88 To the extent that persons are denied equal participation in
their political process, they are denied the sharing of political power or
shared participation in a process of political determination by an aggre-
gate "self." In a given case, a denial of self-determination by
governmental or private actors operating in their own or in foreign terri-
tory can also infringe the human rights of freedom of expression,
including the free exchange of ideas nationally and transnationally; 9 the
86. See PAUST, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 4, 20-21 nn.8-10; CHEN,
supra note 80, at 23.
87. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, U 2-3, 55(c), 56. See also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among Member States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
1883d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc A/8082 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on
Principles of International Law]; G.A. Res. 107, supra note 78. Concerning Charter-based
human rights duties of states, see Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Ian), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24); Legal Consequences for States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South-Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion
South West Africa]; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
88. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 1(1), at 173. See also Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law, supra note 87, ("the right freely to determine ... their political status....
political status freely determined by a people); African Charter, supra note 73, art. 20; G.A.
Res. 107, supra note 78, pmbl., at 1, 3(a), at 2; CHEN, supra note 80, at 30-33. The Human
Rights Committee created by the ICCPR has also recognized that "denying peoples the right
to determine their own political status ... would be incompatible with the object and purpose
of the Covenant." General Comment No. 24, supra note 79, at 9. The Committee has also
recognized that Article 1 "imposes on all States parties corresponding obligations" and that
paragraph 3 "imposes specific obligations... not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-
A-vis all peoples.... It follows that all States parties to the Covenant should take positive
action to facilitate realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination."
General Comment No. 12, U.N. GAOR H.R. Comm., 21st Sess., at 10-12, 2, 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (1989).
89. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19, at 178.
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freedom of assembly;90 the ability of citizens to take part in governmen-
tal processes directly or through freely chosen representatives; 9' and the
rights of individual dignity and worth,92 equality, and freedom from im-
permissible discrimination on the basis of political or other opinion.9'
Enjoyment of political self-determination and human rights are thus in-
tertwined.
Such an interconnection is also recognizable in other ways. For ex-
ample, the only legitimate or authoritative government the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirms, is one based on the will of the
people: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of gov-
ernment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by se-
cret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." 94 The human right to a
government based on the relative free will of the people is necessarily
mirrored in the concomitant right of a people "freely to determine ...
their political status" recognized in connection with self-determination.9
As the International Court of Justice has recognized, "application of the
90. Id. art. 22, at 178.
91. Id. art. 25, at 179.
92. Id. pmbl, at 173. See also U.N. CHARTER pmbl. ("reaffirm... the dignity and worth
of the human person").
93. ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 2, 26, at 173-74, 179. See also U.N. CHARTER pmbl.,
arts. 1, 3, 55(c).
94. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also American Convention on Human Rights, supra note
26, preamble, arts. 23, 29(c), 32(2); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
arts. XX, XXXVIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V./I.4, rev.
(1965); African Charter, supra note 73, art. 20(2)-(3); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, July 29, 1990, pmbl., reprinted in
29 I.L.M. 1305 (commitment to "development of societies based on pluralistic democracy");
CHEN, supra note 80, at 33; Jordan J. Paust, Remarks by Jordan J. Paust, in CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 126-
30 (1992); Theo Van Boven, Remarks by Theo Van Boven, in id. at 133-35; Thomas M.
Franck, Remarks by Thomas M. Franck, in id. at 137; Jordan J. Paust, International Legal
Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of Governmental Power, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1063 (1990) [hereinafter Paust, Governmental Legitimacy]; CONG. REC. 34073-75 (1985).
The expectations of the Founders of the United States were that ultimate authority and "sover-
eignty" remain with the people of the United States and not the government. See, e.g., PAUST,
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 197, 201,220, 328-31, 333-35, 340, 342.
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27), the majority opinion of International Court of Justice stated that "adher-
ence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary
international law," confused "sovereignty" with the "State" or "regime," and assumed nonsen-
sically that a totalitarian dictatorship comports with "freedom of choice." Id. 263. Such
statements are in serious error since the right of self-determination under the U.N. Charter is
not that of a "State" or a "regime" but that of a relevant people, and both self-determination
and human rights require a domestic political process based on the relative free will of a given
people.
95. See Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 87.
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right, of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the
will of the peoples concerned. 96 Modes of enjoyment of the right of self-
determination also recognizably include "[t]he establishment of a sover-
eign and independent State ... or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people,"97 modes that are particularly rele-
vant to the process of self-identification of a given people and their
consensual participation in a political process.
CONCLUSION
Private individual, group, and institutional participation in the
international legal process is a social, political, and legally-relevant fact.
Awareness of these forms of participation can help one to avoid the
fallacious myth and to guide realistic inquiry not merely concerning
identification and clarification of rights, duties, competencies, and
responsibilities under international law, but also with respect to
violations of international law and various sanction processes, strategies,
and possibilities. Rigid state-oriented constructs, like other theories in a
box, are inattentive to such realities and can also inhibit attention to the
full value and worth of individual human beings and political
self-determination of peoples recognized in human rights law and
enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Clearly, international law is not
merely the province of the state or even one most powerful state. "On
states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly
incumbent."9
96. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 32 (Oct. 16).
97. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 87. See also CHEN,
supra note 80, at 33-34.
98. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1107. District Attorney Rawle also noted that "[t]he
rights of man are the rights of all men in relation to each other...." Id. at 1118.
